This project will utilize Peter Kropotkin"s theory of Mutual Aid to reconsider ontology in IR.
Introduction
This paper treats Kropotkin"s Mutual Aid Theory as a prototype biological theory that feeds into an emergent understanding of social ontology. The direction that Mutual Aid Theory takes in informing social theory is reinforced by modern developments in such fields as evolutionary biology, complexity theory, critical anthropology, animal ethology, and biosemiotics. The developments of interest to social theory in each of these fields surround the view that the atomistic ontology of reductionist approaches to both the natural and social sciences are increasingly giving way to holist ontological approaches reliant on the logic of self-organization and emergent complexity phenomena, where seemingly disparate parts are, sometimes inexplicably, better understood as integrated in a larger whole. This paper aims to introduce Mutual Aid Theory, give an overview of the shift in ontological understanding it prompts, and touch upon the implications this ontological shift has for International Relations theory. The specific engagement with IR theory takes a layered approach, the first entry point is a critique of the application of sociobiology made by Thayer to support the arguments of Realism; and, the second entry point is a general argument to re-understanding ontology in global politics.
1 I conclude that Kropotkin"s social and natural theorizing are two sides of the same coin and can inform the emancipatory agenda of critical IR theory.
Peter Kropotkin (1842 Kropotkin ( -1921 or to affect parsimony on a theory betray not only the scientist"s own social and cultural inclinations, but also reveal the social process of knowledge production, itself.
For Charles Darwin, the use of metaphor was crucial in both his formulation of the theory of natural selection and his communication of that theory to his British audience. His metaphor of choice was the "struggle for existence" and the way it was interpreted by him, his audience and his successors was in a distinctly Malthusian sense. Commenting on the implications of Darwin"s choice of metaphor, Daniel
Todes has written that " [s] uch rhetorical authority contributes to a metaphor"s cognitive function, enabling it to clarify certain points and obscure others, to encourage exploration of certain questions and distinctions, and to relegate others to relative unimportance".
4
The Malthusian-inspired metaphor implied that natural selection was dominated by organism-to-organism competitive interactions in an overpopulated environment. Darwin depicted the "face of nature" as a crack in a surface packed tightly with wedges, where one wedge is pummelled another relents. 5 The term "struggle" was often used interchangeably with competition, and Darwin acknowledged that the dynamics of the struggle were between the same species by virtue of their like food sources, habitats and predators.
While the obviously dated Victorian terminology and biases towards less-technologically advanced peoples can be dismissed as being a blatant product of the era, there are more basic political assumptions in his writings that are still taken as axiomatic today. For example his negative views on increasing populations: "It is impossible not bitterly to regret, but whether wisely is another question, the rate at which man tends to increase; for this leads in barbarous tribes to infanticide and many other evils, and in 5 civilised nations to abject poverty, celibacy, and to the late marriages of the prudent". 6 The political implications of this negative view on population expansion become much more explicit as Darwin correlates the effects of improved human material conditions with an increase of "undesirables": The articles railed against Huxley"s interpretation of Darwinian natural selection being nothing higher than a gladiator show. In his theory, Kropotkin placed greater emphasis on the intraspecific cooperation of organisms, rather than the Malthusian-inspired intraspecific competition paradigm put forward by
Darwin"s successors. Kropotkin gave greater importance to the direct action of the environment on organisms to produce a natural selective force. It was in the face of these harsh conditions that Mutual
Aid arose as an adaptive strategy.
The importance of Huxley"s interpretation to biology was in the role he played to disseminate Darwin"s ideas on natural selection-he was known by his contemporaries as "Darwin"s Bulldog". Darwin was known to be hesitant in sharing his ideas-and even hesitated to publish his theory of natural selection for 20 years before finally being prompted to put it to print by Wallace"s co-discovery of natural selection.
Therefore, Darwin"s role in purging both theological and teleological (for example Lamarck"s transmutationist theory of evolution) assumptions from explanations for natural processes was articulated 30, no. 4 (2000) .
Migratory habits in species resulted in the selection of genotypes that favoured the pre-conditions required for such migration-namely, sociability, which engendered trust among individuals of the same species.
Despite viewing these natural checks as hostile to species development, Kropotkin also argued that the inevitable nature of natural checks selected against those species who lacked the sociability to overcome them. 12 Even should some individuals survive natural checks through competing intraspecifically, those individuals will have survived merely one onslaught because of certain traits that have permitted it to do so; however, those traits may not allow it to overcome subsequent adversity which requires different traits.
In contrast to the orthodox emphasis on the importance of individual-oriented traits like speed, strength etc., which best serve to aid in the survival of a lone organism in a certain situation, Kropotkin argued that sociability is an evolutionary panacea-communities of organisms could handle many more varieties of situations. For example, the variability of ecologies in sometimes erratic and dynamic ways seemed to contradict theories reliant on the slow process of genetic variation. Therefore, carrying Kropotkin"s argument to its logical ends would entail adopting the position that any trait that favoured sociability over individuality would be selected for-this includes intelligence (when it serves the purpose of mitigating conflict and conceiving of more efficient forms of cooperation) as well as traits that might be characterized in some scientific circles as redundant and even self-defeating, such as empathy and
kindness. Yet, the highly social nature of humans (second only to eusocial insects, perhaps) could account for humans being the preponderant mammal in the complex web of life.
Kropotkin argued that the strength of the social instinct transcends individually-oriented instincts, such as self-preservation. He observed individual animals that would engage in reckless behaviour in the face of danger for what appeared to be the sake of the herd. This led organisms that engaged in Mutual Aid to benefit with increased fitness, less individual energy expenditure in rearing offspring, more successful 9 migration and greater intelligence. 13 Glassman synthesizes three general principles for the intraspecific cooperation argued by Kropotkin: 1) organisms struggle against their environment, 2) species which engage in cooperation to overcome their ecology are successful, and 3) egoism becomes detrimental when cooperation is so crucial to survival.
14 This alternative theory is not alone in dethroning the orthodox reading of natural selection; the complexity science revolution has also added to a more sophisticated understanding of evolution. Michod argues for an emergent reading of evolution which holds that cooperation achieved through a dynamic mechanism of natural selection leads the units of selection (biological entities, including genes) to be subject to increasingly more complex rules as the unit complexity increases. 15 Fitness at a lower level of organic complexity is traded for fitness at a higher level through the cooperation of individuals at the lower level.
Therefore, the effects of natural selection are, by their very nature, an open-system and in continual flux;
its parameters and method of function cannot be tidily accounted for with mathematical models or metatheories which describe the preconditions for fitness. This prompts a re-conceptualizing of "new levels of individuality".
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However, cooperation is also a term that often goes unproblematized. Cooperation, seen on individualistic terms, is seen as benefitting both individuals. This view holds that the equal reciprocation between organisms to increase fitness is an epiphenomenon of the egoistic interests of individuals-this is represented in evolutionary explanations for altruism which have spawned individual-or gene-based explanations such as Hamilton"s "inclusive fitness", Axelrod"s "tit-for-tat", Trivet"s "reciprocal altruism", Equally of interest is Lynn Margulies" theory of symbiosis, where cellular evolution was characterized through the integration of separate non-nuclear microorganisms (prokaryotes) into other microorganisms to form the first nuclear cells (eukaryotes). 19 This counters the traditional mutation and environmental adaptation theory-driven approaches to the rise of multi-cellular organisms. As multi-cellular organisms grew increasingly more complex, speciation among multi-cellular organisms arose producing categories (species) of "individual" organisms which further cooperated to expedite survival. This theoretical approach calls into question the unit-level analysis supported by Huxley"s paradigm-the error of biologists is stopping their analysis at the individual level. This process prompts us to question why we have arbitrarily chosen to limit our expressions of ontology to that of the individual organism when cooperative acts occur on a daily basis at the societal level to produce a higher order of complexity, thereby producing a new referent on which selective pressures act.
The Importance of Critical Realism
My methodological/meta-theoretical approach, Critical Realism, attempts to overcome individual-based ontologies, which includes the "selfish gene" ontology popularized by Dawkins
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, by not reducing all ontological assumptions to pure empirical observation. 21 The observable unit of selection-the gene-has been determined through scientific investigation, and has become the favoured primitive ontology in natural selection. However, recognizing the limitations of current scientific capacity for understanding ontological realities through strictly empirical observation, contradictory empirical observations of the necessity of human sociality for species survival point to ontological realities beyond the gene that play a significant role in natural selection.
Bhaskar"s formulation of Critical Realism hinged on his recognition that science examines existing practices and does not rely on transhistorical truths, such as emancipation. 22 This is in contrast to philosophy, which is generally grounded in history as it examines social practices. Critical Realism (CR) maintains epistemological relativism-which is to say that beliefs are social products, knowledge is transient and neither truth values nor rationality exist outside of historical context.
In applying a CR approach to ontology in the social sciences, Wight states that we must adopt the view that societies are irreducible to people (social forms are required for any social act), since social forms pre-exist, they are autonomous and may be studied as objects, and the causal powers of social forms establish their reality. 
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CR actually works to bring back scholarly work that has been marginalised by the mainstream for being unmethodical, unsystematic or politically biased.
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Wight argues that the pursuit of knowledge should not be defined and demarcated into a specific scientific method, but channelled in a necessarily fallibist manner to understand ontology as entirely distinct from the methods we use to come to understand it. Positivism is anti-realist in nature in that it attempts to limit the boundaries of knowledge through the privileging of a certain method. 27 As Wight notes,
"[e]pistemological questions cannot be settled in advance of, or distinct from, ontological questions".
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Attempting to settle ontological questions relies on the depth realism congruent with scientific realist philosophy-assumptions on the existence of entities/mechanisms existing independently of our capacity to know them; thus, appearances do not exhaust reality. 29 Using this realist approach to science implies hypothesizing about the potential existence of unobserved entities, and using a large repertoire of "metaphors, analogies, similes, models and conjectures" to "infer from the known the unknown". 30 Thus, there are three key factors associated with a realist approach to social ontology: 1) societies cannot be reduced to people (social forms are required for any social act); 2) since social forms pre-exist, they are autonomous and may be studied as objects; and, 3) the causal powers of social forms establish their reality. 31 Wight continues, "these can be seen as arguments for the reality of social forms that are not explainable solely in terms of individuals". especially in the realm of economic logics. 38 The stance that radical anthropologists, such as Sahlins and David Graeber, take recognizes culture as an integral component to our biology; however, from the variety of human cultural forms made known through ethnographic studies, no culture is entirely reducible to a biologically-grounded "nature". Accordingly, Morris argues that the preponderant preoccupation of anthropologists to study non-state societies has produced an "elective affinity" between radical thought (in the form of anarchism) and anthropology.
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The "radical" view that culture is derived from biological evolution but not dependent upon it has also been taken up in recent years by the fledgling field of biosemiotics. Hoffmeyer describes biosemiotics as that which:
implies that processes of sign and meaning cannot, as is often assumed, become criteria for distinguishing between the domains of nature and culture. Rather, cultural sign processes must be regarded as special instances of a more general and extensive biosemiosis that continuously unfolds and acts in the biosphere
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Biosemitoics is also considered as process philosophy, where the biological is considered to be in the process of emerging from the non-biological. Consequently, the crucial nature of semiosis leads to a semiotic interdependence of organic creatures. Signs are innate to human biology, and culture emerges from this. Thus, the social individual becomes the discursive representation of the biological individual. These are not perfunctory assertions. They are grounded in the acknowledgment of a seamless continuum between the social and the natural on all levels, a recognition of the material limitations of our biological conditions, and the interdependent nature of all the biomass within our ecosystem.
Shifting Political Ontology
41 Roger Masters, 'Human Nature, Biology, and Justice ', International Political Science Review 15, no. 4 (1994) . 42 Masters, 'Human Nature, Biology, and Justice', 324.
The application of evolutionary theory to International Relations was most notably done by Axelrod when he collaborated with W. D. Hamilton to write the article "The Evolution of Cooperation" (1981), where selfish individuals cooperate through modeling on the "Tit-for-Tat" paradigm. Robert Trivers"s concept of reciprocal altruism is similar in that non-reciprocators are punished. 43 However, the premise behind these various cooperative strategies is that of a self-serving logic-organisms act on an individual level to, ultimately, further their own interests.
Finding ways to cooperate in the face of the collective action problem seems to be at the heart of the liberal enterprise in the same way that finding ways to stabilize power relations seems to be at the core of realism. However, these two normative commitments have their own-often tacit-ontological assumptions. It is these embedded ontological assumptions that have established individualism as the reference point for understanding social and political interactions. Thus, this ontological orientation has deterministically led to the same consequences for concepts key to IR theory, such as anarchy. Equally, some scholars have sought to naturalize the individual (either conceived of in human or statist terms) as the sole referent for understanding the nature of social/political interaction.
It may seem counterintuitive to attempt to predict social interactions based on the study of an individual ontology; however, this is done regularly and unproblematically. It is in the contemplation and questioning of ontological assumptions that is of central importance within the realm of my approach.
Reconsidering what we consider as "real" results in a cascade of analytical consequences. A specific example of this is Thayer"s attempt to explain Realism in biological and anthropological terms. 44 In doing so, he naturalizes this individualistic approach to international politics through a reductionist application of evolutionary theory.
Thayer argues that the two theoretical foundations for classical Realism-Niebuhr"s theological assumption of evil within humans and the Hobbes/Morgenthau metaphysical assumption that humans possess an inherent animus dominandi-lost influence with the rise of Waltz"s structuralism. However, Thayer takes to task the resurrection of these classical assumptions by integrating Darwinian evolutionary theory to substantiate the two human traits of egoism and domination.
45
In addition to his theoretical contribution to the Realist school, he also posits that evolutionary theory assists in understanding the ultimate causes of war by examining organized violence in other species and the evolutionary adaptive value of ethnocentrism and xenophobia in contributing to ethnic conflict.
Thayer"s justification for applying evolutionary theory to Realism is to provide a verifiable theoretical framework to reinvigorate the tradition. 46 To explain egoism, Thayer invokes Dawkins" "selfish gene" theory, which reduces the level of analysis to the gene as a self-interested replicator. 47 Domination is explained through the biological production of "dominance hierarchies" in "competitive situations" where particular individuals in groups achieve greater access to resources; and, the "ubiquity" of this model of social organization in the animal kingdom suggests a generalisable principle of hierarchy that may contribute to an organism"s level of fitness. 48 The evolutionary need to belong to a "dominance hierarchy", 
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Thayer offers three characteristics of evolutionary theory that provide a "better foundation for realism than the theological or metaphysical arguments advanced by Niebuhr or Morgenthau": 1) it meets
Hempel"s criteria for Deductive-Nomological models of science and also holds true to Popper"s principle of falsification, 2) it is widely accepted by the scientific community as a valid explanation for human evolution, and 3) it supports the offensive realist position that in the "competitive environment" of international anarchy, states naturally seek to dominate one another.
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However, where some would criticize his positivist epistemology, his epistemological claims predetermine his ontological primary to be at the individual-or possibly even gene-level. 51 It should come as no surprise that, true to his realist theoretical orientation, Thayer freely abstracts his individualistic ontology up to the state level and can posit that interactions among states existing in conditions of "anarchy" lead to conflict. It is in this notion of predetermined behaviour in "anarchy" that concerns me most.
Anarchy is a widely misconstrued term. It is often analogized as "chaos" 52 , and the implications from this semantic treatment signify a natural state of conflict. Ashley argues that the concept of anarchy has been given "foundational truth" status in International Relations, despite its arbitrarily constructed nature; the discourse of the anarchy problematique is "always in the process of being imposed". 22 the notion of strategic interdependence in iterated PD games despite their lack of acknowledgement of its fundamental nature to the actors represented in their models.
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While Milner acknowledges the crucial nature of including notions of interdependence in political analysis, she stops short of problematising the root and logical consequences of interdependence. Implicit in her view, as well as those perspectives that internalize interdependence as a value of political interaction, the causes of interdependence, a phenomenon seen both domestically and internationally, becomes an unquestioned assumption, much the same as the assumptive causal force of anarchy as necessitating conflict. In addition, Milner"s interpretation of the form interdependence takes, namely the "strategic interdependence" of cooperation among actors predicated on their respective individual benefits, takes the individual unit as its core ontological assumption.
However, to probe the root cause of such integral interdependence is to begin to form an understanding of the imperative nature of sociality and the ontological implications of this imperative social interaction.
Where interdependence is as important to understanding politics as hierarchical relationships, then ontology becomes the primary question of political analysis at both the domestic and international levels.
However, there has been a stunning silence of anarchist voices in helping to interpret what "anarchy" in IR is really about. Anarchism is a social philosophy above all, and anarchy, as it is conceived of in anarchism, is typified by free association 60 . In stark contrast, the "anarchy" in IR is not free association-it is humans brought together under mutually incommensurable and irreconcilable legal and authoritative frameworks known as states. In anarchist philosophy it is near universally accepted that society precedes the state, and that free associations occur on a day-to-day basis despite the looming presence of the state-morally, economically and militarily-in the lives of humans. In CSS, Booth has acknowledged that the ontology of security for utopian realists necessarily takes on a "holistic character and non-statist approach". 67 This is the closest that we can come to Kropotkin"s biological ontology as it can be understood through anarchism. Following Booth"s definition of emancipation as "the theory or practice of inventing humanity…freeing people…from contingent and structural oppressions", Kropotkin"s understanding of biologically-grounded social ontology and the antithetical role of the state to human development can inform critical IR theory of where it should place it"s ontological foundations. 68 The adoption of Kropotkin"s ontology would help critical theory to overcome the theoretical incoherence of its emancipatory agenda.
Kropotkin argued that the development of the state, which arrogated to itself the role of facilitator to cooperation, and, thus imposed its own methods of cooperation-regardless of the suitability to circumstances. There was another implication of centralizing cooperative tendencies within the state structure, and Kropotkin argues that there grew out of this a dependence on authority. This dependence had the atomizing effect of "the development of an unbridled, narrow-minded individualism". 69 In sum, the state created boundaries, restrictions, regulations and ideologies antithetical to the preconditions to and conditions of sociality. Should recognition be given to the inherent tendency of humans to socialize and define their own destinies, and sociality be allowed to flourish through what anarchy really impliesfree associations-then the emancipation project of critical theory would be realized. 
